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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK M. BARBER and : 
MARIO T. BARBER, by and 
through his guardian ad litem, : 
Ray Harding Ivie, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
: Case No. 860216 
vs. 
: Priority No. 13(b) 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
De fendant/Re spondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Utah's Financial Responsibility Act has long mandated 
that insurers provide liability coverage where their insureds 
are involved in an accident while operating a non-owned vehicle 
with permission. Defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
provided in their policy of insurance an exclusion which would 
limit non-owned vehicle coverage to those instances where the 
insured was operating a "four-wheeled land motor vehicle". 
Appellant, an insured of Farmers Insurance Exchange, contends 
that the exclusion of coverage where the insured is operating a 
non-owned motorcycle is invalid in that it violates the letter 
and intent of Utah's Financial Responsibility Act, and that the 
exclusion violates public policy. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-41-2 (1953). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
After borrowing a friend's motorcycle, appellant 
Mario Barber was involved in an accident with a pickup truck in 
the parking lot of Orem High School. The pickup truck had in 
force a collision policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
Mario Barber was also an insured under a policy of Farmers 
Insurance Exchange issued to his father. Farmers extended 
collision coverage to repair the pickup truck, and then sued 
their insured, Mario Barber, as well as his father (on a theory 
of statutory liability due to the father's signing of a minor's 
drivers license application). The Barbers tendered the defense 
of the action to their insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange, who 
denied coverage based on an exclusion in their policy which 
limits non-owned coverage to those instances where the non-
owned vehicle has "four wheels11. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant 
Farmers Insurance Exchange holding that the exclusion was 
valid. The court ruled that the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act 
had incorporated Utah's Safety Responsibility Act, and that a 
specific exclusion for motorcycles in the No-Fault Act 
permitted an insured to exclude liability coverage while the 
insured is operating a non-owned motorcycle• 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Frank M. Barber had been a long time 
insured of Farmers Insurance Exchange. When his son, appellant 
Mario Barber, reached the age of 16 and received a drivers 
license, his father called Farmers Insurance agent, Tommy 
George, and requested that Mario be given full insurance 
coverage to the same extent as any other family member. (R. 
203) . 
After notifying his Farmers1 agent that his 16-year 
old son had received a license, Frank Barber's insurance 
premiums were increased. (R. 203). 
On March 21, 1983, Mario Barber was involved in an 
accident in the parking lot of Orem High School after borrowing 
a friend's uninsured motorcycle. The accident occurred when 
Mario Barber drove into a vehicle operated.by Robert Bernards, 
also an insured of Farmers Insurance Exchange. (R. 106). 
Shortly after the accident, Farmers Insurance 
Exchange cancelled all coverage for the Barber policy under the 
contract of insurance issued to appellant Frank Barber. (R. 
204) (Affidavit of Frank M. Barber). 
Farmers policy with Bernards provided collision 
coverage for damage sustained to the Bernards' vehicle. 
Farmers paid to have the vehicle repaired pursuant to the 
Bernards' policy, (R. 5, 80). Following payment to Bernards, 
Farmers acted pursuant to the subrogation rights given them in 
the Bernards policy, and brought suit in the name of Bernards 
against Mario Barber, the owner of the motorcycle Barber was 
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operating, and "John Does 1 through 5n. (R. 106). One of the 
John Doe defendants was identified as the person signing Mario 
Barber's drivers license application. (R. 143) (Amended 
Complaint) . 
After being sued by their insurance company, the 
Barbers were forced to seek legal assistance. They retained 
attorneys to defend the suit brought against them by their 
insurance company, and the attorneys in turn tendered the 
defense of the lawsuit brought against the Barbers to Farmers 
Insurance Exchange. Farmers denied coverage on the basis that 
the policy between Farmers and Barber excluded liability 
coverage while the insured was operating a non-owned vehicle 
with less than four wheels. (R. 106-107). 
The Barbers privately retained attorneys then assumed 
the defense of the action brought against the Barbers by their 
insurance company. After a significant amount of legal action, 
Farmers eventually dismissed their suit, without prejudice, 
claiming that it was not worth the effort of prosecuting. (R. 
106) . 
Following the dismissal of the suit brought by 
Farmers against Barber, the Barbers filed the present suit 
against Farmers, claiming that Farmers had breached its 
contract of insurance by refusing to defend or indemnify. The 
Barbers further claimed the breach of a fiduciary duty, inten-
tional interference with the plaintiff's property interest, 
willful and malicious conduct on the part of Farmers, violation 
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of Insurance Department Regulations and Statutes, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. (R. 108). 
The parties moved for summary judgment. The court's 
holding that Farmers could validly exclude coverage was 
dispositive of all claims, and the present appeal was taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants maintain that the trial court improperly 
applied Utah's statutory insurance scheme in ruling that 
Farmers was permitted to deny liability coverage in this 
instance. The legislature clearly mandated in the Financial 
Responsibility Act that insurers licensed to do business in 
this state provide coverage to their insureds while operating 
non-owned vehicles with permission. The definition of "motor 
vehicle" contained in the Act does not draw a distinction 
between two and four-wheeled motor vehicles. 
Despite the definition of motor vehicle contained in 
the Financial Responsibility Act, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of respondent based upon an apparent 
exclusion in Utah's No-fault Act which purportedly permits an 
insurer to exclude no-fault benefits to the operators of 
motorcycles. Appellants respectfully contend that the court 
erred in three respects. First, appellants maintain that the 
legislative intent in mandating liability coverage for "motor 
vehicles" was clear and unambiguous in including motorcycles 
within the class of vehicles requiring liability coverage. It 
is appellants' argument that the trial court should have 
applied the definition in the Financial Responsibility Act in 
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determining the question of liability coverage, instead of 
using an exclusion in the No-Fault Act which relates solely to 
no-fault benefits. Second, the trial court was apparently 
unaware of a prior Utah Supreme Court decision, Coates v. 
American Economy, 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981), which reviewed the 
purported exclusion in the No-Fault Act and extended no-fault 
benefits in the exact situation presented here. Finally, the 
No-Fault Act itself recites that it has no application in 
property damage cases such as is presented in the present case. 
Finally, appellants maintain that to create a gap in 
liability coverage such as that contemplated in the present 
case would be in violation of the public policy articulated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in recent decisions. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT 
IN UPHOLDING THE MOTORCYCLE EXCLUSION TO 
THE NON-OWNED VEHICLE COVERAGE PROVIDED IN 
THE POLICY OF INSURANCE. 
For decades, the courts and legislatures of our 
various states have recognized the necessity for public liabi-
lity insurance to protect victims of automobile accidents. 
Accordingly, insurers who are authorized to do business in a 
state must conform their policies of insurance to satisfy the 
statutory mandates which have been deemed necessary to provide 
that public protection which the legislature deems necessary. 
The Utah legislature has codified the requirements for auto-
mobile liability insurance in Section 41-12-21, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Included in the statutory mandate is the 
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requirement that automobile liability policies provide coverage 
where the insureds are operating a non-owned motor vehicle with 
permission. Specifically, the statute provides: 
(b) such owners policy of liability 
insurance: 
(1) shall designate by explicit 
description or by appropriate reference all 
motor vehicles with respect to which 
coverage is thereby to be granted; and 
(2) shall insure the person named 
therein and any other person, as insured, 
using such motor vehicle or motor vehicles 
with the express or implied permission of 
such named insured, against loss from the 
liability imposed by law for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of such motor vehicle . . . in the 
amount specified in Section 41-12-1(k) of 
this act. 
(c) such operators policy of liability 
insurance shall insure the person named as 
insured therein against loss from the 
liability imposed by him by law for damages 
arising out of the use by him of any motor 
vehicle not owned by him, within the same 
territorial limits and subject to the same 
limits of liability as are set forth above 
with respect to an owners policy of liabi-
lity insurance. 
(d) such motor vehicle liability policy 
shall state the name and address of the 
named insured, the coverage afforded by the 
policy, the premium charged therefor, the 
policy period, and the limits of liability, 
and shall contain an agreement or be 
endorsed that insurance is provided there-
under in accordance with the coverage 
defined in this act as respects bodily 
injury or death or property damage, or 
both, and is subject to all the provisions 
of this act. (emphasis added) 
In the present case, Farmers appears to raise no 
dispute that Mario Barber would have been entitled to complete 
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and full protection under the terms of his father's insurance 
policy, had the vehicle he had borrowed from his friend been a 
four-wheel automobile instead of a motorcycle. However, it is 
appellants' contention that the requirements of the Safety 
Responsibility Act do not permit for such a distinction. It is 
to be stressed that the requirements for non-owned vehicle 
coverage as contained in Section 41-12-21, refers to liability 
coverage for the use of non-owned "motor vehicles". The term 
"motor vehicles", is specifically defined in the Safety Respon-
sibility Act so as to avoid any possible ambiguity. Section 
41-12-l(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states as follows: 
'Motor vehicle1 means every self-propelled 
vehicle which is designed for use upon a 
highway, including trailers and semi-
trailers designed for use with such 
vehicles (except traction engines, road 
rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, 
power shovels and well drillers) and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric 
power obtained from overhead wires but not 
operated upon rails. 
It is beyond cavil that the definition of "motor 
vehicles" as contained in the Act mandating the requirement for 
automobile liability insurers, would include two-wheeled 
motorcycles. However, an examination of the policy exclusion 
relied upon by Farmers in the present case shows that the 
exclusion is clearly repugnant to the classification provided 
by the legislature in establishing requirements for which 
vehicles must be covered by a liability policy written pursuant 
to the Utah Safety Responsibility Act. The exclusion relied 
upon by Farmers in this case reads: 
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The unqualified word 'insured1 includes. . . 
(b) With respect to a non-owned automobile, 
(1) the named insured or a relative, 
and 
(2) any other person or organization, 
and owning or hiring such automobile if 
legally responsible for its use by the 
named insured or a relative, but only in 
the event such named insured or relative is 
legally liable for the occurrence; provided 
the actual use of the non-owned automobile 
by the persons in (1) and (2) above is with 
the permission of the owner. (R. 60). 
In providing this coverage however, Farmers chose to 
alter their definitions from those provided in Utah's Financial 
Responsibility Act. Instead of adopting a definition 
consistent with the legislature's statutory classification of 
"motor vehicles", Farmers defined the term "automobile" as 
follows: 
Automobile means a four wheel land motor 
vehicle designed for use principally upon 
public roads, except a midget automobile, 
and includes any trailer designed for use 
with a private passenger automobile. 
(R. 60). 
It is clear that the legislature intended a far 
broader class of motor vehicles to be covered by liability 
insurance policies than that contemplated by Farmers' exclusion 
in the present case. To exclude motorcycles from the statutory 
classification is no more logical than to exclude non-owned 
liability coverage where the insured is operating a car that is 
painted red, or a truck outfitted with a camper. Even more 
important, however, is the fact that the exclusion relied upon 
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by Farmers not only provides less protection than the statutory 
definition would require, but it makes a mockery of the legis-
lative intent. There is to be no doubt that the intent of the 
legislature in enacting the Safety Responsibility law was to 
provide protection for the innocent victims of tortfeasors. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 
P.2d 329 (Utah 1980). Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 
737 (Utah 1982) . An individual who has suffered loss of life, 
limb, or health at the hands of a negligent motor vehicle 
operator, suffers no less because the tortfeasor was operating 
a motorcycle instead of an automobile. The injury remains the 
same. 
To require public liability insurance to provide 
compensation to some victims, but not others, draws an uncon-
scionable distinction which our system of justice should not 
tolerate. This court has repeatedly held that such arbitrary 
denials of compensation to injured victims will not be approved 
in the State of Utah. In striking down Farmers1 household 
exclusion clause, in striking down the automobile guest 
statute, in striking down the products liability statute of 
repose, this court has recognized that the injured victims1 
rights should not be sacrificed as we apply some arbitrary 
classification in assigning the tortfeasor to his procrustean 
bed. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P. 2d 231 (Utah 
1985) (household exclusion); Mai an v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 
19 84) (automobile guest statute); Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (products liability statute of 
repose). 
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In upholding the exclusion in the present case, the 
trial court held that the Utah No-Fault Act incorporates 
provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act, and that an 
exclusion contained in the No-Fault Act concerning motorcycles 
would permit the exclusion attempted here by Farmers. 
Appellants do not dispute that the No-Fault Act and the Safety 
Responsibility Act must be read together. This court has so 
held on at least three occasions. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980); 
Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982); Malan 
v. Lewis, 692 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
However, it is appellants1 contention that the trial 
court erred in three respects in applying the No-Fault 
exclusion to liability coverage in the present case. 
Initially, the court's logic should be examined. The trial 
court stated in its ruling of March 26, 1986, (R. 232): 
When incorporated into the No-Fault Act 
41-12-21(c) requires operator's coverage 
for damages arising out of the use of 
non-owned vehicles of a kind required to be 
registered under Title 41, but excluding, 
however, motorcycles. 31-41-3(1). 
Appellants' first assignment of error concerning the 
trial court's application of the No-Fault exclusion is simply a 
question of determining the controlling statutory language. 
The Safety Responsibility Act contained its own definition of 
terms. It was unnecessary to go to any other section of the 
Utah Code to determine the legislature's intent. The legisla-
ture in mandating public liability insurance required coverage 
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for an insured while operating a non-owned motor vehicle. 
Motor vehicle was defined in that very statute to include 
vehicles such as motorcycles. No ambiguity was present which 
would require the trial court to search other sections of the 
Utah Code to identify a different definition. Indeed, the 
court was not even urged to do so by respondent in the court 
below. 
Furthermore, the trial court misconstrued the 
purported exclusion for motorcycles contained in the No-Fault 
Act. Apparently, the trial court was unaware that the Supreme 
Court had already interpreted that exclusion as it applied to 
no-fault benefits, and found that the exclusion was inappli-
cable in the precise situation which is presented here. The 
court's attention is drawn to its earlier decision in Coates v. 
American Economy, 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981), where the purported 
exclusion for motorcycles contained in the No-Fault Act was 
found to be inapplicable where the motorcycle was involved in a 
collision with defined motor vehicle. 
A third assignment of error concerning the trial 
court's reliance on the motorcycle exclusion of the No-Fault 
Act is of significance. The present case involves a claim by 
appellants for defense and indemnity from their insurer arising 
out of an action involving property damage to another's motor 
vehicle. The No-Fault Act specifically excludes its own 
application to property damage claims. Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 31-41-2, provides: 
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This Act (No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Act) is not designed to have any effect on 
property damage claims. 
A final parenthetical observation should be made. 
While appellants are unable to find specific authority in 
support of this claim, it is respectfully submitted that the 
reason why motorcycle accidents are frequently excluded from 
no-fault insurance policies is because of the greater severity 
of injuries suffered by riders of motorcycles. Quite clearly, 
cyclists are afforded less protection in the event of an auto-
mobile collision, and suffer greater injury. Recognizing the 
greater cost of no-fault insurance for such injuries, the 
legislature may be within its rights to exclude coverage to 
those who assume the risk of operating motorcycles so far as 
no-fault protection for their own injuries is concerned. 
However, such a distinction should once again be avoided as it 
relates to the innocent victim. The victim does not choose his 
own tortfeasor, nor can he usually act to avoid the risk. 
Rather, the distinction when applied to liability claims as 
opposed to no-fault claims, presents an unconscionable scenario 
where one victim will be protected while another will not, 
solely by virtue of the vehicle his tortfeasor chose to operate 
at the time of the negligent conduct. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is appellants1 contention that Farmers Insurance 
Exchange is doing business in the State of Utah as a privilege. 
That privilege requires Farmers to satisfy the statutory 
conditions imposed upon automobile liability insurers by our 
legislature. It is respectfully submitted that Farmers1 
exclusion of non-owned motor vehicle liability coverage where 
their insureds are operating a motorcycle, is repugnant to the 
letter and intent of Utah's Financial Responsibility Act. 
As such, Farmers' conduct in this case can only be 
seen as outrageous. When the Barbers purchased their policy of 
automobile insurance, they were purchasing peace of mind. 
However, when the Barbers needed the protection which they 
expected, and which the Financial Responsibility law apparently 
requires, they found that their trust in respondent had been 
poorly placed. Not only did Farmers refuse to protect the 
Barbers, Farmers were the ones that the Barbers needed 
protection from. 
In suing their insureds and refusing to provide them 
protection, Farmers places their sole reliance on an attempt to 
create a gap in public liability insurance coverage which 
extends far beyond the present case. It is respectfully 
submitted that the intent of the legislature in requiring 
financial responsibility by motorists runs directly contrary to 
Farmers' efforts to undermine the extent of public liability 
law in this state. It is therefore requested, on behalf of 
these appellants and others, that this court find that coverage 
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in this case was required by the laws of Utah, and that the 
case be remanded for a determination of damages arising from 
Farmers' breach of contract and tortious conduct. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th 
3HI1 
-E & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
It is hereby certified that service of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellants has been made on counsel for the Defendant-
Respondent by mailing four copies thereof, with postage prepaid 
thereon, this 4th day of August, 1986, properly addressed as 
follows: 
A. Alma Nelson, Esq. 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPM^N 
1300 Continental Bank Build-in 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 
IV^E & YOUNG 
:torneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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AARON ALMA NELSON 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (8 01) 3 64-3627 
Utah State Bar No. 2379 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK M. BARBER and 
MARIO T. BARBER, by and 
through his guardian ad 
litem, RAY HARDING IVIE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 66,519 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Jadgment duly came oefore this Court for hearing 
on February 7, 1986, at 11 o'clock a.m. Plaintiffs appeared througl 
their attorney, Ray Pnillips Ivie, and Defendant appealed through 
its attorney, Aaron Alma Nelson. Prior to the hearing the parties 
submitted Statements of Points and Authorities, pursuant to Rule 
2.6, Rules of Practice in the District and Circuit Courts of the 
State of Utah. 
After hearing arguments by tne parties and reviewing the 
memoranda submittec by tne parties and the Court being fully advisee 
tne ruling of tne Court havmc been issued, it is herebv 
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgirient is hereby granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Defendant is hereby awarded 
Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint and action against 
Defendant, with prejudice and upon the merits. 
DATED this day of , 1986-
EY THE COURT: 
RAY M. HARDING 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this 
/& day of /fy^/ 1986, to: 
Mr. Ray Phillips Ivie 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IVIE & YOUNG 
P. O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
/5. / / 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
FRANK M. BARBER, et al., ) Case Number 66,519 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) RULING 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, ) 
Defendant. ) 
******** 
Having considered defendant's motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 2.8, heard argument on the matter and 
considered the memoranda cf the parties, defendant's motion for 
summary judgmert is granted. There are no genuine issues of 
material fact aid defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
The definition of Section 41-12-21 motor vehicle, when 
that section is incorporated into the Utah No-Fault Act via 31-
41-5(1)(a), is governed by the No-Fault Act inasmuch as the 
definition of a motor vehicle under the No-Fault Act and the 
Safety Responsibility Act (SRA> are inconsistent. 31-41-3(1), 
41-12-Ke;. It is unlikely that the legislature intended to 
require insurance coverage for the operation of non-owned 
motorcycles by an insured under an act passec^with ;the purpose 
of stabilizing the rising costs of automobile insurance. It is 
also noted that insurance polices issued re comply with the No-
Fault Act must comply with the SRA "except as modified to provide 
the benefits and exemptions provided for in [the No-Fault Act]'*. 
31-41-5(1)(a). This is e clear declaration that where 
inconsistent, the No-Fault Act governs over the SRA. Thus, when 
41-12-21(c) is incorporated into the No-Fault Act, the 31-41-3(1) 
definition of motor vehicles governs. It specifically excludes 
motorcycles from the operation of the No-Fault Act. When 
incorporated into the No-Fault Act 41-12-21(c) requires 
operator's coverage for damages arising out of the use of non-
owned vehicles of a kind required to be registered under Title 
41, but excluding, however, motorcycles. 31-41-3(1). 
Since plaintiff's insurance policy did not cover him 
for the use of non-owned motorcycles, defendant had no duty to 
defend plaintiff under the terms of the policy, defendant cannot 
be held liable to plaintiffs for failure to defend, and judgment 
is granted for defendant on its motion. Plaintiff's conplaint is 
dismissed as to all causes of action. 
Defendant to prepare an appropriate order. 
DATED this ^ ^ a a \ ' of Mar**rr^J986. 
cc: Ray Phillips Ivie, Esc. 
Sherman C. Young, Esc. 
A. Alma Nelson, Esq. 
31-41-2 INSURANCE 
eiudc: Colorado. Conner-ticut. Delaware. Lav Reviews. 
F i o n a s , {JCOTSIL. Hawaii . Kansas. Ker- No-Fault Automobile Insurance ir; Utah 
tucKy. Maryland. Massachusetts . Michigan, —State Consti tutional Issues,. 1970 Utah 
Minnesota. Nevada. Nev Jersey, Nev L Kev. 24S. 
York. Orecoi;. Pcunsyivanij, . Puerto Kico Compensation Svstems and Utah'* N 0 
and South C a r o m s . p a u } t S ta tu te , 1973 Utah L. Kev. 383. 
Countrywide Overview of Automobile 
No-Fault ' Insurance. 23 Defense L. J . 443 
Safety Responsibility Ac:. 14-32-1 ct (1974 . 
Cross-Re ference. 
6 
seq 
31-41-2. Purpose of act—Property damage claims not affected.—The 
purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain prescribed benefits 
in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either insurance or other 
approved security but on the basis of no fault, preserving, however, the 
right of arj injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the 
most serious types of injuries occur. The intention of the legislature is 
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient, 
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of the personal injury-
claims that arise out of automobile accidents, these being those not involv-
ing great amounts of damages. This act is not designed to have any effect 
on property damage claims. 
History: L. 197S, ch. 55, § 2. Bee Am. Jur. 2d. No-Fault Insurance 
S$ 1-34, when published. 
Collateral References. *" 
InsuranceC=>4.1. Validity and construction of ''no-fault'' 
44 C.J.6. Insurance § 64. automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. E. 3d 
229. 
31-41-3. Definition of terms.—As used in this ac t : 
(I) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle of a kind required to be 
registered under Title 41, but excluding, however motorcycles. 
(2- "Person" includes every natural person, firm, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation, or any governmental entity, or agency of it. 
(3j "Owner* means a person who holds the legal title to a motor 
vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agree-
ment or lease with option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the 
right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for 
purposes of this act. 
(4 "Insured* means the named insured, the spouse or other relative 
of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named in-
sured, including those who usually make their home in the same household 
but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using the described motor 
vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner. 
(5 "Occupying* means being IL or upori a motor vehicle as a pas-
senger or operator or engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding, 
or alighting from a motor vehicle 
(6 "Pedestrian* means any natural person not occupying or riding 
upon a motor vehicle 
«"T "Department" means the Utah insurance department 
Hisiory: I*. 1973. en. 55. $ S 
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9. Special ami-theft laws 
10. Offenses against registration laws — suspension or revocation of 
registration. 
11. Registration and license fees. 
12. Penalties. 
IS. Automobile driver education tax. 
ARTICLE 1 
WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED 
Section 
41-1-1 Definitions 
41-1-1. Definitions. The following words and phrases when used in this 
act shall, for the purpose of this act, have the following meanings respec-
tively ascribed to them: 
(a) "Vehicle." Every device in, upon, or by which any person or prop-
erty is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices 
moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. 
(b> "Motor Vehicle." Even- vehicle which is self-propelled and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley 
wires, but not operated upon rails 
(c) "Motorcycle." Every motor vehicle having a saddle for the use of 
the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact 
with the ground, but excluding a tractor. 
(di "Truck Tractor." Even- motor vehicle designed and used primarily 
for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry a load other 
than a part of the weight of the vehicle and load so drawn. 
(ei "Farm Tractor." Even motor vehicle designed and used primarily 
as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and other 
implements of husbandry 
(f "Road Tractor " Even motor vehicle designed and used for drawing 
other vehicles and not so constructed as to earn any load thereon either 
independently or any part of the weight of a vehicle or load so drawn. 
(g "Trailer " Even* vehicle without motive power designed for carrying 
persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so con-
structed that no pan of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle 
(h "Semitrailer " Even vehicle without motive power designed for 
carrying persons or propern and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and 
so constructed thai some part of its weight and that of its load rests or 
is carried DY another vehicle 
(i« "Specialiy Constructed Vehicle " Every vehicle of a type required to 
be registered hereunder not originally constructed under a distinctive 
name, maKe. mode^ , or type by a generaln recognizee manufacturer of 
vehicles and no; materially altered from its original construction 
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41-12-30 
41-12-31 
41-12-32 
41-12-3$ 
41-12-34 
41-12-35 
41-12-36 
41-12-37 
41-12-38 
41-12-39 
41-12-40. 
41-12-41. 
Registration of vehicle — Effect of guspensioc — Transfer of registration — 
Rights of conditional vendor, chattel mortgagee, or lessor 
Return of license and registration to commission — When required — Penalty 
Crimes and penalties — Failure to repon accident — False reports — Forgad 
or unauthorized evidence or proof of financial responsibility — Driving %ttm 
suspension or revocation of license or registration, or nonresident s operatiw 
privilege 
Publicly owned vehicles — Applicability of act to 
Certificate of self-insurance — Issuance — Cancellation 
Automobile liability policies — Equitable apportionment among companies tf 
applicants — Appeal to insurance commissioner — Petition in district court. 
Repealing clause 
Retroactivity of act. 
Remedies as cumulative or exclusive. 
Interpretation and construction of act. 
Separability clause. 
Short title. 
41-12-1. Definitions. As used in this act: 
(a) "Commission" means the department of public safety. 
(b) "Department" means the division of safety and financial 
bility of the department of public safety. 
(c) "Judgment" means any judgment which shall have become final 
expiration without appeal of the time within which an appeal might 
been perfected, or by final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court 
competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States, upon a 
of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any 
vehicle, for damages, including damages for care and loss of ser 
because of bodily injury to or death of any person, or for damages 
of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use 
or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement for such 
(d) "License* means any license, temporary instruction permit 
temporary license issued under the laws of this state pertaining to 
licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles 
(e> "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle wn 
designed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semi; 
designed for use with such vehicles (except traction engines, road 
farm tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well drillers) and 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead 
but not operated upon rails. 
(f) "Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident 
state. 
(g) "Nonresident's operating privilege" means the privilege 
upon a nonresident by the laws of this state pertaining to the o; 
by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor vehicle owned, 
in this state. 
(h) "Owner" means a person who holds a legal title of a motor 
or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for 
ditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon peri 
of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate 
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possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a 
mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional 
vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose 
nf this act. 
(i) "Operator" means every person who is in actual physical control of 
* motor vehicle. 
(j) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, associa-
tion or corporation. 
(k) "Proof of financial responsibility" means the proof of ability to 
respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents occurring subse-
quent to the effective date of this proof, arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, in the amount of $20,000 because 
of bodily injury to or death of one person, in any one accident, and, subject 
ID this limit for one person, in the amount of $40,000 because of bodily 
injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and in the 
amount of $10,000 because of injury to or destruction of property of others 
in any one accident, or in lieu of the foregoing limits, a single limit of 
not less than $30,000. 
(1) "Registration" means the certificate or certificates and registration 
plates issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the registration 
<tf motor vehicles. 
(m) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, or any province of the Dominion of Can-
ada. 
History: L. 1951. ch 71, §1; C 1943. 
lopp., 57-13-41; L. 1951 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 
U6L ch. 93, § 1; 1973, ch. 91,11; 1981. ch. 185, 
I I 
Casapiler's Now*. 
The 1951 (1st S.S.t amendment substituted 
*tospartment of public safety" for **tax com-
ariafion of this state'* in subd. (a): and subst-
Hsftad "division of safety and financial 
ibility of the department of public 
in subd. (b) for Inotor vehicle div>-
i i f the stat* tax commission ' 
1961 Amendment increased the proof 
responsibility amounts in subd 
lirom $5,000 to $10,000 for injury or deati 
t person; from $10,000 to $20,000 for 
or death of two or more personE: and 
$1,000 to $5,000 for injury or destruc-
I K of property 
^Ute 197? amendment rewrote the introdur-
ISJPT paragraph substituted **$i5,000' for 
SNMOCr and "$30,000" for "$20,000" in subd 
mk added ~or in lieu of the foregoing kmits 
* Mgie limit of not less that $25,000" tc 
. (k;: and made minor cn&nges in phrase-
"" l^ie 1981 amendment increased the proof 
tf financial responsibility amounts in subd 
(k> from $15,000 to $20,000 for injury- or 
death of one person; from $30,000 tc $40,000 
for injury* or death of two or more persons; 
from $5,000 to $10,000 for injury or destruc-
tion of property; increased the single limit 
minimum from $25,000 tc $30,000 it subd 
(k/; and made a minor change in phraseology 
Title of Act. 
An act tc be entitled the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Responsibility Act, providing for 
giving proof of financial responsibility by 
owners and operators of motor vehicles vio-
lating the motor vehicle laws of the state of 
Utah or involved in an accident in whicr 
damages result in excess of $1GC, requiring 
the giving of security for the payment of 
damages providing for the suspension of 
operator? licenses and registration certifi-
cates until sucn security is furnished, provid-
ing for the appointment of the secretary of 
the state of Utah as process agent for not-
residents using the highways of this state ir 
actions arising out of any accidents; prescrib-
ing the procedure to mate proof of hnancia 
responsibility, and prescribing penalties for 
violations hereof, and other matters relating 
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thereto; and repealing Chapter 68, Law6 of 
Utah 194S - Laws 1951, ch. 71. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1951 (1st S.S.). ch 10 
provided: "This act shall take effect July 1. 
1951" 
Cross-Reference*. 
Words and phrases denned by statute, con-
struction of, 68-3-11 
Hearing requirement*.. 
Motorist who had received notice that his 
license would be suspended under this act 
and who did not pursue his remedies at state 
level was not deprived of due process. 
MacBeth v. State (1971) 332 F Supp 1191. 
Police power of state. 
The state, in the exercise of its police 
power, may reasonably regulate the use of its 
highways, with the objective, among others, 
of minimizing the hardship flowing from the 
financial irresponsibility of users involved in 
accidents- In re Kesier (1960) 187 F Supp 277, 
affirmed in 369 US 153, 7 L Ed 2d 641, 82 S Ct 
807 
Proof of financial responsibility. 
Insurance policies used as security under 
31-41-5 of the No-Fault Insurance Act must 
include the minimum liability limits detailed 
in subsec. (ki definition of proof of financial 
responsibility. Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidel-
ity £ Guaranty Co (1980) 619 P 2d 329 
Collateral Reference*. 
Automobiles §=> 147 
60 CJS Motor Vehicles §164.50; 60A CJS 
Motor Vehicles 5§ 248,268, 271. 
Compulsory insurance, 7 AmJur 2d 464 A 
seQ.. Automobile Insurance §20 et nTj 
Financial responsibility or security Tsqaa^ 
ments. 7A AmJur 2d 332-346, Autom^iw 
and Highway Traffic H 156-170 
Cancellation of compulsory or "financ^f 
responsibility" automobile insurance, 34 kim 
2d 1297
 tf 
Construction and application of automatic 
insurance clause or substitution provision m 
automobile liability or indemnity policy M 
ALR 2d 936 ; 
Construction and effect of exclusionarr 
clause in automobile liability policy m * S S 
policy inapplicable where vehicle is used as 
''public or livery' conveyance," 30 ALE 2d H k 
Effect of provision of liability pobcy cof^T 
ing hired automobiles but excluding fro* 
definition of "insured" the owner of soch 
vehicle or his employee, 32 ALR 2d 572.
 H| 
Insured's first accident, policy provision 
extending coverage to comply with Fina&ctf 
Responsibility Act as applicable to, 8 ALfiM 
38fc s 
Liability of insurer under compulsory a&? 
utory vehicle liability policy, to injured thai 
persons, notwithstanding insured's failure %s 
comply with policy conditions, as measuifl 
by policy limits or by limits of Financial 
Responsibility Act. 29 ALR 2d 817 
Modern status of rules regarding materidR 
ity and effect of false statement by insuraMi 
applicant as to previous insurance cancella-
tions or rejections. 66 ALR 3d 74£ | 
Presumption and prima facie case ai 1% 
ownership of vehicle causing highwav aock. 
dent, 27 ALR 2d 167. * '£ 
Trailers as affecting automobile insurance^ 
31 ALR 2d 29b ^ 
Validity of Motor Vehicle Fi&ane 
Responsibility Act 35 ALR 2d 1011 
41-12-2. Administration and enforcement of act — Judicial 
of order or act of commission — Hearing on probability of 
on part of uninsured operator, (a) The commission shall administer 
enforce the provisions of this act and may make rules and reguial 
necessary for its administration 
(b) Any person aggrieved by an order or an act of the commission 
within ten days after notice thereof, file a petition in the district court 
a review thereof; but the filing of such petition shall not suspend the 
or act unless a stay thereof shall be allowed by a judge of said court 
ing final determination of the review. The court shall summarily hear 
petition and may make any appropriate order or decree 
(c) At any time within twenty days after providing notice that the 
mission is suspending an operator's license because of probability of lial 
ity on the pari of an uninsured operator, the operator whose license is 
502 
41-12-21 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(b) If any insurance carrier not authorised to transact business in this 
state, which has qualified to furnish proof of financial responsibility, 
defaults in any said undertakings or agreements, the commission shall not 
thereafter accept as proof any certificate of said carrier whether there-
tofore filed or thereafter tendered as proof* so long as sucb default contin-
ues. 
History: L 1951, ch 71, § 20; C. 1943, 
Supp., 57-13-60. 
41-12-21. Motor vehicle liability policy — Definition — Provisions 
Coverage, (a) A "motor vehicle liability policy" as said term is used 
in this act shall mean an owner's or an operators policy of liability insur-
ance, certified as provided in section 41-12-19 or section 41-12-20 as proof 
of financial responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise provided in 
section 41-12-20, by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact busi-
ness in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as 
insured. 
(b) Such owner's policy of liability7 insurance: 
(1) shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference 
all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted; 
and 
(2) shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as 
insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express 
or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liabil-
ity imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of sucb motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States 
of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of inter-
est and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, in the amount speci-
fied in section 41-12-1 (k) of this act 
(c» Sucb operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person 
named as insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon him 
by law for damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle 
not owned by him. within the same territorial limits and subject to the 
same limits of liability as are set fortb above with respect to an owners 
policy of liability insurance 
id Suck motor vehicle liability policy shall state the name and address 
of the named insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, the premium 
charged therefor, tne poiicv period and the limits of liability, and shall 
contain an agreement or be endorsed that insurance is provided thereunder 
in accoroance with tne coverage denned in this act as respects bodiiy injury 
and deatn or propem damage, or both, and is subject to all the provisions 
of this act 
ie Sucb motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability 
under any workmen's compensation law as provided in Title 35. Utah Code 
Annotated 195$ as amended nor any liability on account of bodiiy injury 
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t£ or death of an employee of the insured while engaged in the employ-
ment, other than domestic, of the insured, or while engaged in the opera-
tion, maintenance or repair of any such motor vehicle nor any liability for 
damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by 
the insured. 
(f > Even* motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following 
provisions which need not be contained therein: 
(1) the liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance 
required by this act shall become absolute whenever injury or damage cov-
ered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy* may not be 
canceled or annulled as to such liability' by any agreement between the 
insurance carrier and insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; 
no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said 
policy shall defeat or void said policy; 
(2) the satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for such injury or 
damage shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the insur-
ance carrier to make payment on account of such injury or damages; 
(3) the insurance carrier shall have the right to settle any claim cov-
ered by the policy, and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount 
thereof shall be deductible from the limits of liability' specified in subdivi-
sion (2> of subsection (b) of this section: 
U> the policy, the written application therefor, if any, and any rider 
or endorsement which does not conflict with the provisions of the act shall 
constitute the entire contract between the parties. 
(g^ Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle 
liability' policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addi-
tion to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such 
excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this 
act With respect to a policy which grants such excess or additional cover-
age the term 4tmotor vehicle liability policy" shall apply only to that part 
of the coverage which is required by this section. 
(b» Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured 
shaL reimburse the insurance carrier for any payment the insurance ear-
ner would not have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy 
except for the provisions of this act 
(i * Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide for the prorating of 
the insurance thereunder with other valid and collectible insurance 
(j * Tne requirements of a motor vehicle liability policy may be fulfiliec 
in tne policies of one or more insurance carriers which policies together 
meet such requirements 
(k Any binder issued pending the issuance of a motor vehicle liability 
policy shall be deemed to fulfill the requirements for such a policy -
History. L 2951 CL 71 § 21 C. 1941 Application 
«ipp- D'-13-(L j m i g e c l l D t appbes oniy tt policies 
reoinrec at proof o' tmancia responsibility 
after tfct owner or operator na* Deer lr ar 
51: 
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accident cr nas violated the motor vehicle 
ia*& Vl&Y Fanr Bureau Ins Co \ Cnugg 
(1957)61 2d 399 315 P 2d 277 
Unless the msurec was withic the purne\x 
o' this acf wnec * particular policj was 
issued its provisions unless iliegai are sub-
ject tc the same con struct) or a* am othe* 
contract Utah Farn: Bureau Ins Go \ 
Chugg (19571 6 I 2d 399 315 P 2d 277 
Thij> sectiOE applies onh tc cases where 
one is compelled u secure a pohc\ after ar 
accident IL order tc be able to continue to 
drive it pertains tc policies obtained wide" 
the Safet\ Responsibiht} Act and has ne 
application to policies writtet before am 
accioent occurs Uestem Casualrv & Surett 
Co v Transamenca ins Co (1971) 26 U 2d 
5C 484 P 2d 1180 
Policies presented as security under 
No-Fault Act. 
Insurance pohcie« used as securin unde" 
31-41-5 of the No-Fault Insurance Act must 
include mmirounr omniDu> coverage mciud 
mg persons operating tne vehicle witr the 
express or imphec permission of tne owner 
insure* as provided ir tnis section Alistau 
Ins Cc \ U S Fidelity & Guarant\ Co 
(1980. 619 P 2d 329 
Reasonable investigation. 
Insure^ lost right u rescind pohc> b> fail-
ure to make reasonable investigation of 
insurability without regard to provisions tf 
subd (f)U) State Fanr Mutual Automobile 
Ins Co v Uood (L971> 25 U 2d 427 482 P Id 
892 
Collateral Reference*. 
Automobile habiht} insurance permisaion 
or consent to employee s use of ca^ within 
meaning of omnibus coverage clause 5 AI£ 
2d 600 
Cancellation of compulsorj automobile 
insurance 171 ALR 550 34 ALR 2d 1297 
Construction and application of automatic 
insurance clause or substitution provision on 
automobile liability or indemnity pobcj $ | 
ALR 2d 936 
Recovery under automobile propertv dam-
age policy express!} including or excluding 
collision damage where vehicle strikes 
embankment abutment roadbed or other 
part o'higbwas 2? ALR 2d 389 
Scope of clause of insurance policy cover-
ing injuries sustained while alighting from 
or entering automobile 19 ALR 2d 51c 
^ ahditv o' Moto- Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Act 35 ALR 2d 1011 
41-12-21.1. Motor vehicle liability policy — Uninsured motorist 
coverage required. Commencing on July 1, 1967. nc automobile liability 
insurance pokc\ insuring against loss resulting frorr liability imposed by 
la\* for bodih injur} o** deatu or propero damage suffered b> ant person 
arising out of tne ownership maintenance or use of & motor vehicle shall 
be debverea issued for delivery or renewed in this state witt respect to 
an> motor vehicle registerec or principalis garaged ir this state umesfi 
coverage is provided in SUCH policy or a supplement to it m limits fo~ bod-
in injury or oeatti set fortlr n sectior 41-12-5 under provisions filec witb 
anc approved bt tne state insurance commission for tne protection o* per-
sons insured tnereunoe~ wnc are iegaln entitled tc recover damages from 
owners or operators of unmsurec motor vehicles and hn-ano-rur motor 
vehicles because of bodin injury sickness or disease including death, 
resulting tnereirom The named insured snaP nave the right to reiec: such 
coverage anc unless tne namec msurec reouests sucr coverage IL writing 
suci co\e*-age need not t* proviaec it a renewa polio or a supplement 
tc it wnere tne named insured nac rejected tne coverage m connection with 
a policy previousn issued to him t>} tne same insurer 
Hisfcorr L 19f' ci* 5S § . 
Title of Acw 
Ar ac D^vminf tns nc ponn & autom' 
bw- habmr insurance ma^ De issueG o* 
resewec wmcr Goes no p^onoe uiunsurec 
moionsi co\ t~2Lg* — .LAWS 19€" cr 5^  
Amount of co* emgt 
1 i* tne ID tec o' tn* legrsiature ir aaon 
inr rut sectiot tns at insurec wnc avails 
51* 
